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RESUMO 
Este artigo discute o processo de selegao de escalas de produgao em um modelo de jogo 
evoluciondrio no qual os requisites de racionalidade sao muito limitados. Supoe-se, apenas, 
que os agentes seguem um processo simples de imitagao. Examina-se, entao, o processo de 
selegao de equillbrios sob duas hipoteses: a presenga ou nao de externalidades associadas 
a espedficas escalas de produgao. Em ambos os casos, discutem-se a viabilidade de 
equillbrios com heterogeneidade de escalas, a possibilidade de lock-in e as implicagoes de 
politico economica. 
PALAVRAS CHAVE 
competigao evolucionaria, retornos de escala e selegao, racionalidade limitada 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the process of production scale selection in an evolutionary game 
model for which the rationality requirements are very limited. It is merely assumed that 
agents follow a simple process of imitation. The process of equilibrium selection is then 
examined in light of two hypotheses: either externalities associated with specific production 
scales are present or they are not. The feasibility of equilibria with heterogeneous 
technologies, the possibility of lock-in and the policy implications are discussed for both 
cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The literature on evolutionary economics in recent years shows that in- 
creasing returns and bounded rationality drastically alter the theory of the 
firm.1 In particular, seminal work by Arthur (1994) and Witt (1993) em- 
phasizes that it is not enough to identify the equilibria associated with dif- 
ferent hypotheses about production scale. Given the possibility of multiple 
equilibria and path dependence, it is necessary to investigate the equilib- 
rium selection process itself in a given market. 
Bounded rationality may take various forms, such as imitation, learning, 
artificially intelligent agents, etc. Different ways of formalizing the deci- 
sion-making process presumably produce different results. This paper dis- 
cusses scale selection in an evolutionary game model that entails minimal 
rationality requirements. The assumption on which the model is based is 
diat given the impossibility of knowing the future, firms follow a simple 
process of imitation formalized by means of a replicator dynamics. Selec- 
tion processes are therefore investigated in accordance with two alternative 
hypotheses on scale returns: either positive externalities associated with 
specific production scales are present or they are not. The possibility of 
lock-in and the optimality of market solutions are examined for both cases. 
Three types of increasing returns are normally distinguished in the litera- 
ture:2 static internal economies associated with the scale of the firm; static 
external economies, which depend on market size; and dynamic econo- 
mies, which derive from accumulated experience and may be internal or 
external. Generally speaking, these three types of return are built into mod- 
els as arguments for unit cost functions. This paper uses a different treat- 
ment. Instead of considering unit cost as a synthesis of technology and 
behavioral rules, the production function arguments used here are the scale 
of the firm and the number of firms that adopt this scale. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section focuses on firms and 
short-term equilibrium. Section 2 discusses the environment and the proc- 
1 See for example GROENEWEGEN & VROMEN (1997). METCALFE (1994) provides many 
references on the subject. A summary of evolutionary theory can be found in WITT (1992) 
2 See METCALFE (1994; 337). 
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ess whereby firms choose production scale. Section 3 analyzes the model 
according to the hypothesis that externalities are absent, and section 4 in- 
troduces externalities. Section 5 discusses the implications of model 
optimality, and the last section presents conclusions. 
1. FIBMS AND SHORT-TERM EQUILIBRIUM 
In this article, we assume the existence of a specific type of externality. We 
suppose that there are two populations of firms. Each one of them uses a 
production scale, and the increase in the number of firms that adopt a par- 
ticular scale raises the productivity of all the firms in this population. This 
type of externalities is merely an assumption. Notwithstanding, this proce- 
dure can be justified with the help of tacit information concept. This con- 
cept is summed up with precision by Dietrich (1997, p. 83): 
Tacit information can only effectively be acquired while undertak- 
ing an activity, with emphasis on learning by doing. An impor- 
tant characteristic is that such information can only be under- 
stood in the context of particular actions and may be shared to a 
significant degree by individuals who have a common (organiza- 
tional) experience. Hence the acquisition of tacit information re- 
quires the development of particular skills and expertise (NEL- 
SON & WINTER, 1982) with the complexity this involves. 
As in the Marshallian tradition,3 we consider that production scale can be 
conceptualized as a synthesis of the organizational aspects of a firm. Of 
3 The relationships between scale and organization constitute the main object of chapters VII to 
XII of the book IV of the Principals. For Marshall, different production scales normally correspond 
to different ways of organizing productive activities. Internal economies are defined as those 
dependent on the resources of individual firms, on their organization and efficiency. External 
economies are those dependent on the general organization of the industry as a whole. Thus, 
although Marshall himself argues in the beginning of the Book IV (1909, p. 139) that the 
organization should be reckoned as a "distinct agent of production", the scale of production (of 
a firm or of a market) is conceived as a synthesis of the organizational aspects of a firm (intemalities) 
or a market (externalities). For an account of Marshallian theory of firm, see ARIDA (1983) and 
PRENDERGAST (1992, 1993). See SCHERER (1980, chapter 4) for a discussion of the 
sources of and limits to economies on scale and its relations with industrial organization. 
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course, this is surely a very strong simplification, but it is useful to keep the 
model tractable. From this point of view, different production scales nor- 
mally correspond to different ways of organizing productive activities. Such 
activities comprise not only aspects that are typically internal to the firm - 
such as the division of labor, management methods etc. - but also elements 
shared by similar firms, such as a supplier network, etc. Furthermore, the 
mobility of labor among similar firms tends to disseminate and generalize 
their internal practices. 
Firms that adopt the same scale therefore have similar organizational expe- 
riences. According to this hypothesis, it can be conjectured that the more 
firms adopt a specific scale, the more likely they will presumably be to 
enhance the productive activities pertaining to this scale. In other words, 
the various activities involved may benefit from the tacit information asso- 
ciated with the organizational context. Thus for each firm these benefits 
acquire the status of an externality which depends on the number of firms 
opting for the same scale. It can therefore be assumed that when a firm 
changes its production scale, productivity is affected not only by the inter- 
nal scale returns but also by this type of externality. 
Consider a market in which firms can choose between two pure strategies 
corresponding to different production scales: JC, i — 1, 2. Let capital be the 
only production factor and the depreciation rate be equal to one. In each 
period the quantity produced is sold at the price for which demand equals 
supply, characterizing short-term equilibrium. Next, firms decide what scale 
to adopt in the ensuing period based on a process of imitation, as discussed 
in the next section. 
Suppose there can be positive externalities associated with the capital added 
by scale. The increase in the number of firms that adopt a particular scale 
therefore raises the productivity of all the firms in this group. Let the pro- 
duction function for the firm representing group i be as follows: 
Wf W 
where n\s the number of firms that adopt scale i. 
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If a = 1, technology is subject to constant internal scale returns; 0 < a < 
1 and a > 1 correspond to the cases of dinunishing and increasing internal 
returns respectively. Ify > 0, there are positive externalities; ify = 0, there 
are no externalities. 
Let X i. be the relationship between scales i andy: 
(2) 
Suppose k1 > which means by way of (1) that A-12 > 1. For the sake of 
notational simplicity, let Xx 2 be designated merely by X. By defining n = nl 
+ ^2 and v = njn, it is therefore possible to express the productions func- 
tions in terms of the capital of firms 1: 
.y, = (my y1=[n{l-v)]r . (3) 
The quantity supplied to the market, y, is obtained by adding the various 
groups: 
y = nlyl + = {nv)Ur k" |^v1+,' + (1 - v)^r j. (4) 
The profit of firms in group 1 is: 
7i\ =p{nvY k"-qJ^r (5) 
where p is the price of the product and q is the cost of a unit of capital 
multiplied by the gross rate of interest. 
Let there be the following inverse demand function: 
1 
p
-J (6) 
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Replacement of the profit function gives the pay-off corresponding to strat- 
egy ky 
(nv) 
^ n
Ur
 (vUy+{\-vfr A") 
qkv (7) 
which can be simplified as, 
7lx- . 
nv 1 + 
V v, 
v
 y 
I a 
-qkv 
J 
(8) 
Symmetrically, for strategy kl we have: 
71 j — 
^(l-v) 
r \1+y 
i+ 
V \
l
~
V7 
, -a 
qXkx. 
(9) 
2. THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE SELECTION PROCESS 
An environment of bounded rationality prevails in the marketplace. Firms 
ignore demand and the scale of their competitors. A firm may compare its 
pay-offs in the present with those of a randomly chosen competitor. This is 
the only information available to guide decisions as to the scale to be cho- 
sen for the next period. Under these hypotheses, it is convenient to assume 
that firms are aware of the environment in which they operate. In other 
words, they know that a comparison of effective profits is only an indica- 
tion of expected pay-offs in the following period. 
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Consider first the comparison between the pay-offs effected by firms. For 
the sake of simplicity, let the total number of firms be normalized4: n = 1. 
Because there are only two scales, the number of firms opting for strategy 
kl is v and the number choosing k2 is (1 - y). The probability that a firm k1 
compares its pay-off with that of a firm is (1 -i7). If it, > ftp the number 
of firms of type k1 disposed to change strategy is v (1 - r). Evidently under 
this hypothesis with regard to profit, no firm k2 is disposed to change scale. 
In the rest of the text, you formulate them they are presented in the not 
normalized version. 
Now admit that tz2 < nv In this case, the only firms that may consider 
changing strategy are those of type kr The probability that a firm k2 will 
compare its profit with that of a firm kl is v. Hence the number of firms 
disposed in principle to change strategy is (1 - r) p. If TCj = 7i2, no firm 
reviews its strategy. 
The process of comparison described above should not be considered suffi- 
cient to determine the number of firms that change strategy. Indeed, be- 
cause firms are aware that effective pay-offs do not necessarily correspond 
to future pay-offs, it is reasonable to suppose that for a given difference in 
pay-offs only some firms will change strategy. Others may deem the differ- 
ence insufficient. It therefore seems appropriate to suppose that the number 
of firms that decide to change strategy is a positive function of the magni- 
tude of the difference in profit. 
Assuming continuous time, the considerations set out above can be repre- 
sented by the following formula:5 
v = -v(1 - v) max{;r2 [v] -^ [v], 0} - (l - v) v min {0,7r2 [v] -^ [v]}. (10) 
4 We adopted this normalization to facilitate the exposition of the dynamics replicator. In the 
remainder of the article, we use the non-normalized version. 
5 For the sake of notational simphcity, v is used instead of v{t). 
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Hence, 
v = -v(l-v)(^2[v]-^[v]). (11) 
The above differential equation is evidendy an adaptation of the replicator 
dynamics used in biology to formalize Darwinian natural selection proc- 
esses. The social interpretation of the replicator is similar but not identical 
to that of Nachbar (1990).6 According to this author, once the population 
that might potentially change strategy has been identified, the percentage 
of agents that effectively change strategy depends on the cost of change, 
which follows a specific probability distribution. Hence he obtains a more 
general formula than the above (i.e. applicable to a game with more than 
two strategies). In the present case, we opted to replace the idea of the 
probabilistic cost of change with the simpler hypothesis that the number of 
firms that change strategy is proportional to the difference in profit, since 
this hypothesis simplifies the presentation and reflects the supposition that 
firms are aware of the bounded rationality environment. 
Let us now discuss the state space of the model. If there are no externali- 
ties, y = 0, and the difference in pay offs, ^[v] = n2-itx ^ is; 
M — qk^-l). (12) 
Then, 
(13) 
6 See VEGA REDONDO (1996, p. 89-90). 
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and 
= ^(A-l). (14) 
n 
Of course, lim (j)[v] = (t)[0] and lim ^[v] = ^[l]. 
v->0 v->l 
But, if y > 0 the function <()[.] is not defined when r = 0 or r = 1. Limits 
exist, nevertheless: 
lim0[v] = i-^(/l-l)> (15) 
v—>0 n 
lim ^[v] = ---qkx (A -1). (16) 
v—>i n 
Hence the function can be redefined as below (where it should be noted 
that y = 0 and y = 1 yield two different limits) and the state space is the 
unit closed interval [0, 1]. 
7i2-7ix, if ve (0,1); 
0[v] = lim (^2 _ )' 7/ v = 
v-»0 
(17) 
lim 7/v = l- 
v->r 
The dynamic behavior of the system can therefore described by the follow- 
ing non-linear differential equation: 
v = -v(l-v)^[v] (18) 
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Ail examination of the above equation permits identification of stationary 
points p = 0, p = 1 and any r'e(0, 1) such that cj) [v] = 0. Moreover, 
because v (1 - v) is always positive in the specified domam, the sign of the 
differential equation is governed by the function § [v]. 
3. ABSENCE OF EXTERNALITIES 
If there are no externalities, ()) [v] is strictly increasing, since, from (12): 
The above result allow cases of the dominant strategy to be identified, as 
set out in the proposition below. 
Proposition 1: Let externalities be absent, i. e., y = 0. Then, precisely one 
asymptotically stable fixed point exists, and any trajectory starting in the inte- 
rior of the state space, converges to this asymptotically stable fixed point. 
Proff: If there exists vg[0,1] such that 0[v] = O, then 
h{v} = -v (l-v)(J)[v] = 0. If ^ {0,1}, h\v\- 0 , whatever the value of 
Cl)[v] . Moreover, in any case, 0<v<v implies (l)[v]<0 and h[v]>0, 
whereas v<v<0 implies (l)[v]>0 and /2[v]<0. ■ 
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Let us interpret this proposition. Because (J) [f] is increasing, if (j) [0] > 0 the 
adoption of scale k1 generates more profit than kv whatever the percentage 
of firms that choose one or the other scale. This is therefore a dominant 
strategy in the context of evolutionary games. Hence firms will tend to 
adopt this scale. Thus whatever the initial condition in the interval (0,1) 
the market converges to v equals 0. Analogously, if (}) [1] > 0 strategy kl is 
dominant and v > 0, and scale kl is eventually chosen by all firms. The 
mixed-strategy equilibrium - which in the context of evolutionary games 
means two scales coexist in the marketplace - is possible, as set out in the 
proposition. When y = 0 , the solution to (f) [p] = 0 is: 
l-Aa+nqkl^ y1+a-/ia) 
nqkx (A-l' l^-i) 1 
A mixed-strategy solution exists if 0 < v < 1, i.e. if; 
l-zT* , i-Aa 
(21> 
These inequalities are possible (they permit positive cost of capital) since 
X > 1, a > 0 and n > 0. 
If the parameters are such that (21) is satisfied, there will be three equilibria: 
two pure-strategy equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium, the first 
two being unstable and the last globally stable. Thus among the infinite 
possible initial conditions, only two generate pure-strategy equilibria. All 
the others lead to a mixed-strategy equilibrium.7 This justifies the affirma- 
tion that in the present case unstable pure-strategy equilibria are not rel- 
evant. 
7 In other words, if the distribution is continuous, then the probability that the initial conditions 
will be such that they result in pure-strategy equilibria is equal to zero 
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Substitution of the mixed-strategy equilibrium in the profit function gives: 
The sign of u. depends on the parameter a. It is null, negative or positive 
according to whether a is equal to 1, greater or smaller than 1. Thus if 
there are constant internal scale returns, the mixed-strategy equilibrium 
entails zero profit; if internal returns are increasing, equilibrium corresponds 
to negative profit and the reverse is true if returns are diminishing. 
The results presented above are traditional. It is worth recalling their inter- 
pretation. If internal returns are constant, the adoption of a larger scale 
merely leads to a linear increase in the results of the smaller scale. Whatever 
the result (profit or loss), it will be greater if the scale is larger. Thus the 
only possibility of equal profits is zero profits. If scale returns are increas- 
ing, the larger scale always presents lower unit costs. If the smaller scale 
generates profit, the same will occur more significandy for the larger scale, 
so that the profits generated by both scales will never be equal and con- 
comitandy positive or null. However, when both strategies generate a loss, 
it is possible that the advantage associated with the unit cost of the larger 
scale will be offset by lower production volume under the smaller scale, 
thus enabling both to generate the same total loss. The reverse evidendy 
occurs in the case of diminishing returns, which explains why profits can 
only be equal if positive. 
The existence of increasing internal scale returns and bounded rationality 
therefore entails a situation in which firms are locked into an adverse equi- 
librium for both strategies. This situation (like diminishing returns) is evi- 
dendy incompatible with long-term full equilibrium defined as a situation 
of extraordinary profits equal to zero. Long-term full equilibrium may be 
obtained through a reduction in the number of firms {n) or in the cost {q). 
Either of these factors reduces losses at both scales but relatively favors 
scale kv which has lower unit costs. This is the same as saying thatf dimin- 
ishes with the reduction in w or which is guaranteed since: 
A-l 
(22) 
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3v 1 1 
>0. 
dn n'qk^A-l) nq2^^-!) (23) 
Thus the market should converge to v and n2 equal to zero, i.e. only the 
larger scale should be adopted at the end of a hypothetical period of long- 
term adjustment. Similar arguments justify defining v equal to one as be- 
ing the long-term equilibrium when returns are diminishing. It must be 
noted, however, that in an evolutionary context convergence to long-term 
equilibrium would be justified only if it were obtained as a result of the 
market game itself. This is not the case in the model. We therefore present 
this here as a finding derived from "comparative statistics" but leave it aside 
in the rest of the analysis. 
In the presence of externalities, y > 0 and market behavior changes dras- 
tically A mixed strategy equilibrium exists. In fact, the introduction of 
externalities preserves the continuity of function (|) [v]. From (15) and 
(16), (j) [0] > cj) [1]. Therefore, the existence of mixed-strategy equilibrium 
is guaranteed (a sufficient condition, not a necessary one) if (j) [0] > 0 and 
However, (()[.] does not present sufficient properties to guarantee equilibrium 
unicity of a mixed strategy equilibrium. In other words, without establishing 
ad hoc hypotheses about the parameters it is impossible, for example, to 
guarantee that (|)(.) increases or decreases monotonously. This evidently 
opens up the possibility of multiple equilibria and different dynamic prop- 
erties. In order to limit the possibilities of the model for the sake of con- 
venience, a constramt on the admissible equilibria can be established, simi- 
lar to that effected by Debreu in the context of general equilibrium: ictv be 
4. EXTERNALITIES 
(J) [1] < 0, i.e. if: 
1 1 
(24) 
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defmed as regular equilibrium if and only if (t)[v] = 0 and d({)[v]/3v ^ 0 . 
Let V be the set of equilibria in the market. If every v e F is a regular 
equilibrium, then the market is regular. Of course, a regular fixed point 
need not be unique. But, if this regular mixed strategy equilibrium is the 
unique one, the dynamic properties of the model can be summarized in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 2: In the presence of externalities, if the regular fixed point is the 
unique fixed point in the interior of the state space, then it is unstable. 
Proof. Let v be the unique regular fixed point in the interior of the state 
space and ^(0)6 (0,l). Because (l)[v] is contmuous and (j) [0] > (() [1], the 
hypotheses of unicity and regularity implies < 0 and 
3/z[v]/3v > 0 • Thus, if v(0) > v then (l)[v] < 0 and v > 0, hence v(/) —> 1 
when / —> oo ; if v(0) < v , then (l)[v] > 0 and v< 0, hence v(/) —> 0 when 
? —> oo • ■ 
To facilitate interpretation of proposition 2, consider the following exam- 
ple. Let kl and n be equal to 1. Assume constant internal scale returns and 
the following values for the other parameters: (L, q) = {3/2,2/3}. If there 
are no externalities, there is no mixed-strategy equilibrium, since: 
7 l-A~a 2 
(25) 
that is, the value of capital is exacdy equal to the lower limit of the condi- 
tion expressed in (21). Hence strategy k2 is stricdy dominant, i.e. whatever 
the initial condition in (0,1) the economy tends to v = 0. The pay-off 
functions are presented in Figure 1. 
Now admit as the only difference with the previous case that externalities 
are present, y = 1/10. A mixed-strategy equilibrium is possible, since the 
condition expressed in (7) is satisfied; the equation c{) [p] = 0 has a single 
real root, v = 0.71. Figure 2 shows the pay-off functions and (j) [v]. 
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The presence of a relatively bounded externality not only makes scale het- 
erogeneity feasible but also makes this equilibrium globally unstable. Thus 
the probability that the market will present a mixed-strategy equilibrium is 
limited. Any disturbance of this equilibrium drives the market toward one 
of the extreme solutions. Moreover, the market path depends crucially on 
the initial condition characterizing path dependence or, in Sargent's terms 
(1993, p. 112), "history dependence", since the initial conditions take on 
an importance that does not disappear over time. 
Now suppose that there are increasing internal scale returns, a = 12/10. In 
the absence of externalities, strategy k2 obviously remains dominant. If ex- 
ternalities are present, there continues to be a mixed-strategy equilibrium, 
v = 0.87, and the same kind of comment can be made, i.e. history is rel- 
evant. Figure 2 shows the functions. 
Lasdy, it bears repeating that externalities opens up the possibility of mul- 
tiple mixed strategy equilibria. For example, a set of parameters (y, a, A., q, 
k, n} = (1/10, 1, 2, 33/50, 1, 1} generates the function (j) |>] presented in 
Figure 4. It can be seen that there are three normal mixed-strategy equilibria, 
die first and last of which are unstable while the second is stable. 
5. WELFARE ANALTSIS 
In the evolutionary context of the model, it may be asked whether the 
market game leads to an optimal situation, when there are mixed-strategy 
equilibria. This situation can be defined as one in which resources are uti- 
lized efficiendy in the sense that reallocation of resources among firms does 
not enable production to be increased. In order to verify the properties of 
productive efficiency, it is convenient to compare the equilibria of the mar- 
ket game with those that would be implemented by a central planner. First, 
recall that because of the stability properties identified in propositions 1 
and 2, the relevant market equilibria are those pertaining to the mixed strat- 
egy in the absence of externalities, and those pertaining to the pure strat- 
egy in the presence of externalities. 
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Imagine a central planner whose goal is to maximize output for a given 
resource, k. When choosing whether to allocate capital to either of two 
groups of firms, the planner decides how many firms will adopt one or the 
other scale. The planner's program can be defined as follows: 
max: 
"l."2 
(26) 
s.to\ kl[nl+n2^)^k, (21) 
^,722 >0. 
Note that there is no limit on the aggregate number of firms. Thus n is 
variable since in accordance with constraint (27), allocating all the capital 
to technology k2 entails a smaller number of firms than opting for ky 
The objective function is increasing, convex and, if y > 0, strictly convex. 
Hence it suffices to compare the values of the function at points {tty 0) and 
(0, w2), provided nl and n2 satisfy (27) with an equal sign, to identify the 
conditions that determine the extreme values. 
If w2 is equal to zero, the maximum value of nl is ^ =k/kl. Substitution in 
the objective function gives; 
f0 
= kUYk?-Y-\ (29) 
The same procedure for (0, n2) results in: 
0, = kl+YAa-YX~Y~l- (30) 
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Therefore, 
- k k 
1
 
o
 
1
 
-y 
Ji' . 
= kUyk"~r~ (31) 
Identification of the maxima depends on the sign of 7 1 -Xj-, i-e. 
there are three possibilities to consider depending on the relation between 
a and 1 + y. Let us first analyze the various possibilities under the hypoth- 
esis of positive externalities. 
If a > 1 + y, the central planner will unequivocally choose to allocate all 
the available capital to technology k2. The economic interpretation is di- 
rect. The effect of increasing scale returns exceeds the effect of externali- 
ties. Hence it is best to opt for the larger scale, even though the number of 
firms is smaller. This provides for the possibility that the market solution 
will not be Pare to-optimal, since depending on the initial condition the 
market may converge to kv If a < 1 + y, scale gains are insufficient to 
offset the externalities and the central planner unequivocally opts for tech- 
nology kv Once again, the market solution may be inferior to the plan- 
ner's, since the market may converge to kr Thus in the evolutionary con- 
text both cases justify the traditional proposition that externalities do not 
entail optimality. 
However, if a = 1 -t- y, increasing scale gains exacdy offset the increment in 
output that would be obtained in (^,0) owing to the externalities. The 
planner is indifferent between points (ftpO) and (O,/^) but prefers them to 
an intermediate solution owing to strict convexity. Because a mixed-strategy 
market equilibrium is improbable, the game leads to an efficient solution. 
Curiously, increasing returns and externalities, which are normally character- 
ized as market failures, offset each other so as to result in an optimal equilib- 
rium. 
Now consider the case of an absence of externalities. With y = 0, the three 
possibilities presented above correspond to the hypotheses of increasing, 
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decreasing and constant scale returns respectively. In cases of increasing 
and decreasing returns, the planner chooses the pure-strategy equilibria. 
Because the market tends toward a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the market 
solution is inferior to that of die central planner. 
If scale returns are constant, die objective function of the central planner is 
linear and assumes constant values on the boundary determined by the 
constraint. Any distribution of capital between die two technologies is in- 
different for the central planner. Hence die market solution is efficient. 
CONCLUSION 
In an environment of hyper-rationality and absence of externalities, the 
final equilibrium of a market does not depend on the initial conditions and 
is efficient. This traditional result of neoclassical economic theory indicates 
that government interference to stimulate the adoption of specific produc- 
tion scales is unnecessary or even counter-productive unless it is motivated 
by distribution issues or due to the presence of externalities. 
The model presented hi this paper is designed to investigate the question 
of externalities in a dynamic context. The first point made is that if there 
are no externalities the market may present a globally stable mixed-strategy 
equilibrium. Scale heterogeneity is therefore possible regardless of what- 
ever hypothesis is raised about internal scale returns. However, if the zero- 
profit condition is imposed, a mixed-strategy equilibrium is compatible 
only with constant scale returns. Hence even hi conditions of bounded 
rationality formalized by the replicator dynamics, the market-game model 
reproduces the traditional results. 
However, hi the presence of bounded rationality and externalities associ- 
ated with production scale, a different situation results. In this case if there 
is a mixed-strategy equilibrium it is globally unstable. The fmal market 
equhibrium therefore depends crucially on the initial conditions. The mar- 
ket may possibly converge toward inferior equilibria. 
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Thus while in the traditional theory the relationship between externalities 
and inefficiency is direct, in the model presented here it is mediated by 
history. The model exemplifies, in a highly simplified context, the depend- 
ence between the development of a competitive industry and the historical 
conditions of its birth. Industries born with small scales and a large number 
of producers may tend to remain in this condition as a result of the com- 
petitive process itself. The transition to more productive scales will then 
require government interference. 
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